

INFORMATION

*For the Earl of Buchan,
Against
Sir John Cochran.*

THE case of the Earl of *Buchans* Suspension hath been so fully debated in your Lordships presence, and doth in effect turn upon so few and so plain points, that the Earls Lawyers are tender to give your Lordships any new trouble in this matter.

It is nottour, and Sir *John* himself cannot deny it, that Sir *John* being at *London* upon occasions of his own, in the year 1695. without the least suggestion or insinuation from the Earl of *Buchan*, or any of his Friends or Relations, he invites him by most kind and and pressing Letters to come up to *London*, and to look after a Marriage, and getting others of my Lord *Buchans* Friends to joyn with him, my Lord *Buchan* was prevailed with, not from the least view of any services that he expected from Sir *John Cochran*, but principally by what was represented by others, and that he perceived Sir *Johns* kindness, and good wishes did go along with it.

The Earl being thus invited and encouraged by Sir *John*, undertakes that expensive journey, and for a time had Sir *Johns* countenance, but no otherwayes then he had the countenance and kindness of his other Friends, and to whom indeed Sir *John* in this matter was only subservient, but Sir *John* being detained at *London* by his own affairs, much longer than he expected, and having insinuat upon my Lord *Buchan* to an intire confidence, he importuned his Lordship to stay beyond his purpose, and then pretending to make his good wishes more effectual, he tells the Earl that Money and credit were needfull, and thereby elicits from him the first Bond of one thousand pounds *sterling*, and for the more full discovery of this practice and designe, your Lordships have seen how he also procured from him a second Bond of a thousand *Guineas*, so that the Earl doth positively inform that in this whole matter he never suspected any designe in Sir *Johns* management, save that he did all in prosecution of his first kindness, and so long as they were in these terms he not only did bear Sir *Johns* expences in any little trouble he gave him, but advanced him also Money when ever he demanded it, and how soon Sir *John* ceased to live with him in the terms of Friendship, for what reasons Sir *John* knows best; But this is certain, that after that Sir *John* became a plain obstracter and opposer of any Match the Earl intended without him, and as to the happy Marriage that the Earl at length obtained. It is well known, that Sir *John* was his declared enemy, and that the Ladies nearest Relations having discovered a little of his practices, did condemn them with the greatest indignation.

This being the true account of matters betwixt the Earl and Sir *John*, and of what gave occasion to the contraverfie now betwixt them, these things are most certain

(2)

certain. 1. That Sir *John* was the first and most pressing inviter of the Earl to go for *London*. 2. That when he came there he had no extraordinary service for Sir *John*, but common Friendship which was as Friendly entertained. 3. That the Earl not only saved Sir *Johns* expences in his affairs all he could but likewise did advance him Money freely and friendly as he demanded it. 4. That Sir *John* having established his confidence with the Earl, did elicit Bonds from him at his pleasure. 5. That no kindness or service that ever he pretended for the Earl, did prove effectual; And 6. That in reality, and to the observation of all that knew how the Earl and Sir *John* lived at *London*, Sir *John* was never put to any extraordinary expence upon the Earls account, whereby your Lordships may plainly perceive how favourable the Earls part is in all this business.

But to the Cause it self, your Lordships after much debat, did by two several Interloquitors find the Court of Chancery in *England*, a competent Court, and Judicatory to the Earl and Sir *John* in the action there moved by the Earl against him, and this was in effect undeniable, for seeing that matters of Fact betwixt them had fallen out in *England*, that the Bond was granted there, that they were both residing there, that Sir *John* appeared upon Citation, and never offered to decline, that he gave in his defences by way of sworn declaration after the form of the Court, and lastly, that thereupon he received an injunction from that Court, there can be nothing more manifest, then that he fully owned and established the Jurisdiction of the Court, and that *lis* was *contestata* there betwixt the parties, and that thereby there was a *jus quesitum* by a judicial Contract to the Earl of *Buchan*, that must be perpetually binding upon Sir *John*, according to the Laws and rules of that court.

It is true it was alledged, that the Bond was granted in the scotch form, with a consent to registration here, but it is as true, that that consent was no wise exclusive of the Earls Pursuing Sir *John* in the Chancery of *England*, for eliciting such a Bond and his unjust pretensions to it; The Bond having been granted as is said, for Causes that were quite out of doors.

After your Lordships had found the Jurisdiction competent, yet you thought fit by your last Interloquitor to find the decree reviewable, against which the Earl did not directly Re-claim, but doth only plead an explication, according to the common Rules of Justice and Law of Nations, that the Decree given in the Chancery of *England* betwixt parties that had owned and established the Jurisdiction in manner forelaid, might be no otherwise, and by no other Law reviewable here, nor it would be in *England*.

Res judicata. Your Lordships know perfectly, that the *res judicata* els where are perpetually sustained here according to the Laws and rules where they are pronounced, when the Court is competent and the authority thereof acknowledged by both parties, and it is evident, by both the debat and Minutes, that Sir *Johns* Procurators could not deny, but that *res judicata* in *France* or *Holland* ought to bind here, and therefore their great pleading was upon pretended specialities, tho in effect there be none in this case.

And your Lordships have so constantly observed the authority of *Res Judicata* abroad, when orderly proceeded according to the Laws of the place, that you have even given Commissions to know *de facto*, what was the Law and Custom of these places where Parties differed anent it; nor did your Lordships judge it either below you, or without your line to inform yourself of this matter, as in any other point of Fact, it being certain, that in cases of this kind, the question neither is, nor can be what will be judged just or unjust here according to our Laws and Customs, but what was *de facto* judged there, where the Parties had Submitted, and the Court was competent according to the Laws and Custom of that place, which is all that the Earl of *Buchan* contends for.

The specialities alledged by Sir *Johns* Procurators were, that the Decree was no final Sentence; that it was but a continuation of the Injunction, that Sir *John* was absent

(3)

absent at the pronouncing. And lastly, that Sir *John* according to the Earls consent to the Registration, had Charged here, and the Earl Suspended, and your Lordships repelled the reason of *lis pendens*: and that a Decreet of Suspension was pronounced here, before this Decree appeared from *England*.

To all which it was, and is most directly and clearly Answered. And 1. That it was a final Sentence, appears by the Decreet it self, which is not only said to be *finale iudicium*, but doth most expressly after sworn Defences and the Examination of other Witnesses, proceed to reduce and rescind the Bond, and that for a clear *Be-cause*, viz. That there was no valuable Cause for it, and ordains the Bond to be cancelled, and the Injunction of not Execution to be perpetual, which in our Terms, is exactly to reduce *parte comparente*, and to suspend the Letters simpliciter. 2. Sir *John* was not absent in all the Process as is manifest by his Compearing, and giving in his sworn Declaration; but the only absence marked is, that he had not Compeared upon the particular Citation given him according to the form of that Court, *ad audiendam sententiam*, which signifies nothing. 3. As to the Earls consent to the Registration, and what followed upon it in *Scotland*, there could be nothing more plainly redargued, for it being undenyable, that a person consenting to a Jurisdiction, and entring into a judicial Contract by *Litis contestation*, binds himself so, both to that Court and to the other Partie, that he can thereafter innovat nothing to frustrate Sentence; it follows by plain demonstration, that all that Sir *John* did in *Scotland*, after he had given in his sworn Declaration, and received the Courts Injunction, was unlawful and reprobate, and never be objected against the Decree of Chancery, to which he so clearly submitted.

It was said, that the Bond was first Registrat in *Scotland*, but that is false, as appears by the Dates; It was also said, That the Earl suspended here. But 1. His suspending was necessarie Defence. 2. His reason of Suspension was the very *lis pendens*, but it was. 3. Alledged, that the *lis pendens* was repelled, and if the *litis pendentia* was over-ruled or rejected, neither the competency of the Jurisdiction nor the Decree of the Court could signifie any thing: but it was as plainly Answered, that *lis pendens* was at first rejected, because not sufficiently instructed, and specially because the Judgment and Decree was not then produced.

But, 2. Since the Suspension is yet open, and no Decreet of Suspension Extracted it is evident, that the Earls reason of *lis pendens*, as well as all his other reasons, must yet be held to be undiscussed.

But, 3. Before any Decreet of Suspension Extracted before your Lordships, the Earl produces the foresaid final Decree most lawfully recovered, as said is.

There were many other By alledgeances made for the Charger, such as, That your Lordships Decreet of Registration first pronounced in *Scotland*, should over-rule the Earls posterior Decreet in *England*, to stop his Procedure there: but to this it was fully Answered, that the Decreet of Registration, and all that followed upon it, was an unlawful Innovation, against the rule of common Justice upon the Chargers part, and therefore not to be regarded.

2. It was alledged, that in *England* our Decreets are not respected, but that was denied; and it is most certain, that tho sometimes they have doubted the verity of our Decreets, because not attested by Seals in their manner, until they were better Informed, yet they never refused their Authority.

But the Sum of all is, That the Earl only contends, that his Decreet of the Chancery may have that Authority here, that is established by the Law of Nations, and that if your Lordships still find it Reviewable, you may declare it to be Reviewable, only according to the Laws and Customs of the Court where it was pronounced, which being most just and equitable, it is hoped your Lordships will also remember that this case is so favourable upon the Earl of *Buchans* part, that if it were needfull as is not, *Rapienda esset occasio*.

In Respect whereof &c.

Note of some Decisions and Customs to which the preceeding Informati- on does relate

IT appears by the Information, that a Sentence pronounced abroad is in the *same* or *Stronger* case with a *Writ* granted there, for the Reasons before ad-
duced. But a *French* Bond was sustained tho' it wanted Writers name
and Witnesses ; and albeit the Subscription was denied. The same in an Af-
signation made in *Germany*. And a Defence competent in England, was sus-
tained against a Write which was to receive Execution in Scotland 11 of De-
cember 1627. *Falconer* contra the Heir of *Beatie*, 27. of July 1633 *Gordon* con-
tra *Morlie*, 15. of Febrnary 1630. *Hopkirk* contra *Jaffrey*.

But farder, the Lords have sustained an confirmation of an Executor made
in *England*, tho there was no special Inventar given up, nor any particular,
mention of the Debt acclaimed in the Defuncts Testament : Albeit such a
confirmation be null by the Law of *Scotland*, The Executor always proving
that to be the form of *England*, Feb. 16. 1627. *Lawson* contra *Kello*, which
is the more considerable in the present case, that Confirmation or Publication
of a Testament, is a *Judicial Act* ; and yet such ane judicial Act as is expd
without the *Consent* or *special Citation* of other Parties having Interest : Not-
withstanding whereof the Lords sustained the Law of the Place to be its Rule
as to its Substience.

But yet further : There is a Tract of Decisions sustaining the Defence of
of *res judicata* in *Ireland*, even where the Writes were alledged to be forged in
Scotland, without any reply upon the Judgements not being valuable here,
or being re-viewable according to the Laws of this Kingdom, 6th. Feb. 1672
Sir Robert Murray contra *Murray* of *Brughtoun* 26. of June 1673. *inter eosdem*
Where it is observable, that if any such reply had been imaginable, it had not
been forgote by such *Lawyers* as were then on the Stage. So in the case be-
twixt *Sir Alexander Hope* and *Sir William Binning* anent the Succession of
Collonel Gordon, the Defence of *res Judicata* was sustained, a day assigned,
and and ane Act extracted for proving thereof.

This is no more then what is the universal Practice of Europe, even when
a *Superior Judge* cognosces upon the Sentence of an *Inferior* Bench. So in
France where the presidial Sentences comes up to the Parliament of *Paris*, they
are determined according to the Laws of the Province where they were pro-
nounced. even tho one or both of the Litigants were *Parisians*. The supream
Court of *Holland* make their review conform to the Statutes of the particu-
lar Towns, vvhence the questioned Sentence had its rise. It is the same thing
in the *Imperial Chamber* of *Spire* : And the Court of *Melchin* deviates not
from the same Rules of common Sense : As no doubt an inferior Sentence
conform to the *Udal-Right* would be sustained with us. Much more when
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(5)

the Judicatories are Co-ordinat and otherwise, it would not be a review, in the second instance, of *res Judicata*, but without any respect thereunto, a cognition as it were in the first.

There can remain no difficulty in the Lords getting notice of the English Law and forms relative to this case, for.

1. Its presumed for the Decree it being of a Sovereign Court, that it is irrevivable by any Judicatur but the Parliament in England: Because by the nature of the thing (& *quod inesse debet in esse presumitur*) the Chancellour is *functus* and cannot revise his own Decree upon Iniquity, nor consequently can our Lords of Session do it *cum par in parem non habet imperium*, unless in so far as Sir John Cochran (against whom the Presumption stands) shall offer to prove that is revivable and ought to be Corrected in England; which will be easily cleared by an Act, Commission and Report.

2. This is no ways forraign to our constitution: but on the contrary, there is a Tract of Custom of Issuing out of such Commissions. So in the former cases of the Bond made in France, the Assignment made in Germany, and the Defence that was alledged to be competent in England. To which shal be only added two others, viz. February 17. 1627. *Lawson contra Kello*, and January 16. 1676. *Cunninghame contra Brown*: in the first whereof Commission was granted for proving the custom of England aient the formalities of a judicial act, the Confirmation of a Testament; and in the second, Commission was granted to the Judges of the Common Pleas to declare what was their Law, in the case of an extrajudicial Writ, For as my Lord Stair lib. i. Tit. 1. N. 16. observes the Law of England, and other Forreign Nations being matter of fact to us, is probable by the declaration of the Judges of the place.

There is a rule L. 30. ff. de judiciis ubi acceptum est semel judicium ibi, & finem accipere debet.

Yet if Sir John had charged the Earl in Scotland, and the Earl had repeated a Reduction upon reasons which require Terms, and a Course of Probation, such as Circumvention, &c. Though this would have been relevant, yet it would not have been found Competent by way of Suspension or Exception, as it is expressly pled for Sir John in the Minuts, 20 of Jan. 1697. And therefore the Letters would have been found orderly proceeded, reserving Reduction as accords. For Registrat Bonds having *paratam executionem* are not to be stopped by any other reasons of Reduction, repeated *incidenter*, then those that are *instantly verified*, or are not *altioris indaginis*, others being presumed *animo protelandi*. But if before Extracting this Decree of Suspension it did happen that the Earls Reduction came up the length of obtaining a Decree therein: on a second calling or a Bill, the Decree of Suspension would be stopped, and the Decree of Reduction received, though *lis pendens* was repelled.

So in our Law, if two Citizens living for the Summer time in their Country-Houses, Titius should pursue Mevius before the Sheriff, for annulling a Bargain of Moveables; and to prevent the effect of this Process Mevius should pursue Titius before the Baillies of his own Town for implement. The Sheriffs Decree is not only first pursued for, but also first Extracted: and Meviuses Process was a fraudulent Anticipation, which being a wrong had in Law no Warrant, and consequently there is no doubt which of these Co-ordinat De-

(6)

Decrees would be preferred by the Lords : and two Co-ordinate Judicatories under the same Prince, though in different Kingdoms, are ~~good~~ the rationale in the paralel State.

As the Chancellery is a Court of Judgment, having rules and practice like the Pretorian Power; So conditions *sine causa*, or *causa data causa non secuta*, are well known even in our Law: The Lords do regulate Bonds bearing borrowed Money (when they are proven not to be truly such) according to their Causes; Particularly in the Year 168 Colonel Patrick Hay Having granted a Bond of 800 lib. Sterl. to the Earl of Kelly, Lord Sinclair, and Sir James Turner, and they pursuing the Collonels Daughters thereupon: It was answered, that the Bond was granted for expected Services at Court in recovery of a great Sum of Mony from the Senat of Hamburg, which were never perfectly done, To which it being replied, and Sir James having Deponed upon many particular instances, as also that he & the other two had stayed a considerable time at London only for attendance of that affair: The Lords notwithstanding thereof would not sustain the Bond in its extent, but in respect the same Money was thereafter *actually* recovered, and the Chargers Soliciting might have promoted it) modified the 800 lib. Sterl. & Annual rents to simple 3000. Merks Scots and Charge of which Decree is presently depending before the Lords. But Sir John is not in the case even of a Modification, since he has not only received 200. lib. Ster. already, but likewise he was rather an Obstruction than a Promoter of the Earls Match.